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In Interpretation and Explanation in the Human Sciences,1 David 
Henderson unveils a proposal to displace previous conceptions of the 
interpretive enterprise with a holistic scheme encompassing the previously 
accepted "Principle of Charity," while elegantly explaining its limitations. 
Not to stop short, Henderson goes on to illustrate the implications of his 
interpretive codification, branded the "Principle of Explicability," for 
attributions of irrationality, and, more importantly, for the relation between 
the method of the human sciences and the natural sciences. As we shall 
presently show, and Henderson himself is aware, there are explicit 
similarities between his account of interpretation and accounts offered in the 
hermcneutic tradition, particularly with regards to the interpretive constraint 
of holism. However, the two traditions focus on different questions and 
problems. Henderson is concerned with issues stemming from the problem 
of "radical translation," characteristic of his Anglo-American predecessors 
Quinc and Davidson; Hans-Georg Gadamcr, of the Continental school of 
hermeneutics, focuses on the issues involved in understanding a text, 
particularly that of another culture and time. While some differences in 
method will stem from differences of available evidence, the question with 
which we arc here concerned is this: Are basic concepts employed in the 
interpretive account presented by Henderson the same concepts employed 
by Gadamcr? What we intend to show is that the "Principle of 
Explicability" docs have applicability within the interpretive practices 
described in Gadamcr's "On the Circle of Understanding," 2 demonstrating a 
link between the interpretive approaches of the Anglo-American and 
Continental Traditions. Differences in emphasis, however, point out the 
subtle variations between the accounts, contrasts which may raise questions 
about their further resolution. We will begin by detailing Henderson's 
account, turning then to Gadamcr in order to relate salient themes. 
I. Henderson's Principle of Explicability 
Henderson's work on interpretation 3 takes place against a background 
of fairly unanimous agreement by other theorists on two basic counts. The 
1 David Henderson. (1993). Interpretation and Explanation in the Human Sciences. 
Albany: SUNY Press. 
2 Hans-Gcorg Gadamcr. (1988). "On the Circle of Understanding." In J.M. 
Connolly and T. Kcutncr, trans. & cds., Hermeneutics versus Science? Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 68-78. 
3 Although Henderson finds it helpful to distinguish between translation schemes 
(applying to language) and interpretive schemes (applying to behaviors) (p. IS), here 
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first of these, that interpretation must be holistic, is represented by the 
notion of the "hermeneutic circle": 
[W]hat interpretation is proper for a particular bit of text or 
behavior is dependent on what interpretation can be settled on 
for the larger text or range of the agent's behavior, of which the 
particular bit is a part (p. 3). 
Accordingly, no meaning or explanation for a bit of text or action is 
possible without taking into account the surrounding context of words and 
behaviors. In practice, this amounts to a back-and-forth reading of the 
whole against the parts, slightly altering the larger picture as the necessity of 
making sense of the parts suggests, and similarly re-reading the parts to 
realize a sensible whole. In terms of understanding behavior, the 
anthropologist is required to account for the actions of a foreign culture by 
seeing individual acts within the context of the behavior of the culture as a 
whole. To give an everyday example, imagine explaining the simple action 
of "stopping at a traffic light" to someone radically unfamiliar with our 
culture: such an explanation would make sense only within the larger 
explained context of automobiles, roads, intersections, and traffic laws, at 
the very least. 
Extreme holism, of the sort which insists that no individual action 
makes sense without a complete understanding of the whole, seems less 
well-grounded. Understanding traffic-lights requires familiarity with a 
certain context, but probably not explicit knowledge of, say, fast-food 
restaurants. The two items, both quite possibly unfamiliar to members of 
certain cultures, have contexts which overlap, but are not particularly 
closely related. Thus an explanation of either could plausibly be couched in 
terms not mentioning the other. Generally, the size and extent of the 
context necessary for explanation will be dependent on the strength of the 
relations between the areas being explained. 
Further, holism prescribes that an interpretation of actions must go 
hand-in-hand with an interpretation of linguistic meaning. This is simply 
because "utterances and (other) actions are so intimately associated that if 
we could not sort out what a people were doing, we should nut think that we 
understood what they were saying" (p. 16). On the other hand, 
discrimination with regards to the meanings of behaviors relics on an 
understanding of the utterances accompanying them. With regard to 
holism, then, Henderson accepts the basic view that explanation situate 
itself within the Zusammenhang of actions and utterances to be explained, 
we will be speaking broadly of all interpretive practices as "interpretation." 
Citations within Part I of this essay will be from Henderson (1993), unless otherwise 
identified. 
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while rejecting the stronger claim that explanation of any action would 
require complete understanding of its interconnections with the whole. 4 
The second count of agreement by contemporary theorists is that 
interpretation is constrained by a methodologically-fundamental "charity." 
Typically, this is construed to mean that interpreters necessarily translate 
words or actions in a manner most consistent with normative rationality, as 
any evidence within a translation of irrationality would count strongly 
against the acceptability of the translation. This is to say, a translation's best 
evidence for its own success is its ability to successfully construe its 
subjects as (mostly) perfectly consistent by the norms of logic. Henderson 
identifies this as the "Standard Conception" of charity: 
The Standard Conception of charity in interpretation: we are 
bound by a fundamental methodological constraint to find 
people rational (p. 33). 
It is important to realize that this conception makes two fundamental claims, 
both of which Henderson intends to overturn: (a) charity is a "fundamental 
methodological constraint" rather than derivative of a more fundamental 
codification of interpretive practice, and (b) charity thus binds interpreters 
to find their subjects rational. 
The obvious problem with the Standard Conception is that, "[s]ince, as 
a matter of fact, no interpretive scheme ever makes people out to be fully 
rational believers of only true things, no interpretive scheme is ever really 
adequate" (p. 34). We are, in effect, bound to continually adjust our 
interpretive scheme until all subjects arc perfectly rational. Since this seems 
rather at odds with actual interpretive practice, certain limitations to the 
Standard Conception have been devised. The two most important attempts, 
which Henderson discusses in detail , 5 are (a) to modify the application of 
charity according to the stage of interpretation, and (b) to modify 
interpretive charitability based on the relative "rational value" of different 
sorts of errors. Henderson is convinced, however, that such ad hoc 
modifications to the principle of charity point out the necessity of a more 
fundamental codification for interpretation. 
This more fundamental principle, christened the "principle of 
explicability," represents the genuinely essential concerns of "social 
scientific endeavor: studying and explaining similarities and variations in 
beliefs and practices" (p. 51). What is intended by making "explicability" 
fundamental is simply to emphasize that the primary concern of the 
interpreter is to explain behaviors or texts. Although charity has its role, 
which is indeed a necessary one, charitable attributions are merely a 
4 For a comprehensive discussion of these issues and their roots in the work of other 
theorists, sec Henderson (1993), pp. 14-26. 
5 See Henderson (1993) pp. 36-49. For a more thorough discussion of the Principle 
of Charity and Henderson's formulation of its Standard Conception, see pp. 26-36. 
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stepping-stone to later stages of interpretation, and thus more advanced 
explanation. 
In the initial stages of interpretation, a "first approximation scheme" is 
formed from available evidence and charitable contributions. At this stage, 
charity is necessary. When I know none of an interlocutor's tongue and am 
struggling to match words and phrases with bits of the environment, I can 
only assume she or he is candidly responding to my queries with genuine 
assent or dissent, and that she or he is basically consistent and rational. 
Finding errors of unexpected irrationality at this stage would indeed be 
evidence of poor translation, simply because translation has no other option 
but to maximize agreement. 6 But even in this stage, the operative principle 
is explication, at least potentially, of the interpreted behaviors. Establishing 
this first level of agreement sets the stage for the possibility of "genuine" 
(uncharitable) agreement or disagreement. A first-approximation scheme is 
necessary for these reasons: 
(1) only by using such a scheme can the identification of putative 
error be made sufficiently precise und well-grounded to warrant 
investigation, and (2) well-grounded information needed for the 
investigation of such attributions of error for explicability is 
accessible only through the use of such a scheme (p. 52). 
Thus the ultimate purpose of chanty is seen in the construction of a first-
approximation scheme for interpretation, the purpose of which is finally 
explication. 
With such a scheme in place, error will certainly rear its head; this 
shouldn't however force us to question our scheme, but rather to seek 
explanation for the error. What counts as error needn't necessarily be poor 
reasoning or surprisingly incorrect beliefs; unusually sharp reasoning skills 
in the untrained or surprisingly advanced beliefs in technologically 
primitive societies can just as possibly appear anomalous. This is simply 
because normative considerations do not determine the structure of our 
interpretive scheme. With explicability as our guide, what we will most 
reasonably read into another's actions will be what is most expected, and 
thus most explainable. In other words, the constraint to charitably prescribe 
rationality according to our norms gives way to the prescription of 
rationality or irrationality according to our best descriptive generalizations. 
Such "errors of rationality" as arise by these means, which are only such 
from the perspective of developed logical norms or science, may be 
6 Agreement is maximized, but not based on normative considerations. Rattier, 
weighting to the Principle of Charily will naturally occur with regards to certain 
sorts of errors due to the appropriate descriptive generalizations concerning where 
errors are most likely (as will be explained below). Thus the earlier attempts to limit 
charity with regard to sorts of errors correctly reflected practice but was incorrectly 
understood. 
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obviously explicable. In the case where such errors are not yet explicable, 
due to the limitations of our current theory or information, but are in 
keeping with our descriptive generalizations, they remain potentially 
explicable when our theory develops sufficiently or more information is 
gathered. 
But other errors do arise after the first-approximation scheme is 
sufficiently developed to provide a background of non-anomalous behaviors 
against which they may appear. Again, even errors which go against our 
earlier descriptive generalizations are not to be discounted; they must 
simply await explication at a later stage of our theory's development or at 
the gathering of more information. Only those errors which defy 
explicability even at a late stage in the development of our scheme may 
cause us to look back at some of the initial assumptions of our first-
approximations. The stage at which any inexplicable errors may appear 
must already be one which has advanced to the stage of holism, of 
sufficiently broad context to allow errors in some areas to appear at odds 
with beliefs in others. 
Obviously, at the stage where genuine errors appear, we have left 
charitability behind. Thus, the earlier attempt to modify the Principle of 
Charily with regards to stages of interpretation brought to light an important 
aspect of the interpretive process only appreciable when charity has been 
subsumed under explicability: 
With access to generally correct information regarding the 
beliefs of source-language speakers, the time has come to get on 
with the central social-scientific business: explanation. 
Accordingly, the constraints of the principle of charity grade off 
and eventually dissipate entirely in the later stages of 
interpretation....[W]e recognize that the principle of 
cxplicability...guides the investigator in the later going (pp. 55-
6). 
In the later stages of interpretation, the emphasis is on the explicability of 
the anomalous beliefs unexplained until that point; charity is no longer at 
issue. Thus, the Principle of Explicability subsumes even those stages in 
the interpretive process previously outside the range of the Principle of 
Charity. We see, then, that "[I]nterpretation is not a matter of imposing a 
normatively derived structure on those interpreted, rather, it is a matter of 
theory-laden description of cognitive and social phenomena" (p. 60). 
Two points about the claim that explication is "theory-laden description 
of cognitive and social phenomena" need to be made. The first is that the 
proper explanatory value of such description is realized in terms of its 
ability to model "relevance relations." Since the description which is 
interpretation is of social phenomena, it must capture a set of relations 
which obtain between dispositions for behaviors (including dispositions for 
verbal behaviors) for the subject social group. Thus, dispositions within the 
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normal social context will be related to other dispositions in ways which 
may be modeled. For instance, dispositions to assent to a certain sentence 
may imply dispositions to assent to a second, under certain conditions and 
for certain reasons. To correctly model these relations in English, we would 
need to translate the two sentences in such a way that they maintain the 
same relationship (for speakers involved in a belief system of the sort 
described). Establishing these relations is more complex than simply 
recognizing normative relations between certain dispositions, which leads to 
the second point. 
As "theory-laden descriptions of cognitive and social phenomena," our 
modeling must invoke our theoretical understanding of cognitive processes 
and social phenomenon. This is to say, interpretation must be seen as the 
"task of interpretive schemes and psychological (and sociological) theory 
(together comprising a global theory), not the task of translation or 
interpretive schemes alone" (p. 71). The point goes back to our earlier 
mention that the construction of an interpretive scheme is dependent on 
generalized descriptions. These descriptions are characterizations of the 
way that people behave, the way they think, and the way they deviate from 
normative rationality. Construction of a first-approximation interpretive 
scheme must be heavily reliant on current psychological theory for its 
expectations, i.e. to weight the charitable appropriations. Explanation at 
later stages is basically the application of appropriate theories about peoples' 
behaviors in the interest of explaining instances of such behaviors. 
Resultantly, the testing of an interpretive scheme, applying the model which 
it constructs, is the testing not only of the scheme itself but of the embedded 
psychological and sociological theories as well; the failure of the model 
may indicate a lack in either component. 
It should be clear from the explanation given here that the Principle of 
Explicability solves the problem of attributions of irrationality which caused 
the Principle of Charity such trouble. Since we are constrained not to find 
our subjects preponderantly rational but to find them minimally predictable 
via our previous descriptive generalizations about behavior, neither 
rationality nor irrationality arc implicitly explainable. Thus, irrational 
behaviors arc as potentially explicable as rational behaviors, or more so in 
certain situations. If, for instance, my experiences with Southern Baptists 
suggest that, in the face of explanations concerning the Paradox of 
Omnipotence, they continue to assert that God is omnipotent while at the 
same time admitting the paradoxical nature of this claim, this error may 
become part of a descriptive generalization (at the level of folk psychology 
at least; more accurate and precise empirical study may find a link which 
goes beyond the folk-psychological level, of course). Forming a descriptive 
generalization is not, in itself, suitable explanation, however; what is 
necessary is for the particular occasion of the act described to qualify as an 
instance which fits with our generalization, and therefore be explained 
through the theories which count toward explaining the generalization itself. 
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In (he case of the persistent Baptist, psychological and sociological theories 
will shed light on the tenacious nature of religious convictions, answering 
our questions of both how and why such behavior is brought about within 
the systematic relations of the subject's beliefs. 
In response to the question of whether such a global theory as the one 
we arc suggesting would be self-validating, Henderson points out that 
theories constructed according to such practice have not eliminated 
anomalies (p. 75). Nor can they be expected to do so until we have at our 
disposal 
a set of psychological and sociological theories that can be 
combined with interpretive schemes for all people, and when so 
combined, lead us to model and expect what we do observe. 
This, like any ideal of empirical adequacy for scientific theory, 
is a high goal and not easily attained (p. 76). 
We are not merely forcing anomalies into conceptual boxes to explain them 
away. Rather, like any scientific theory, interpretation progresses through 
continual upgrading of the theoretical implements of which it makes use, 
approaching the point where current anomalies can be explained via correct 
theories. 
We see here the connection Henderson wishes to draw between the sort 
of explanation appropriate in the natural sciences and that of interpretive 
procedures within the human sciences. Previous acceptance of the Principle 
of Charity as "a fundamental methodological constraint on adequate 
interpretation...makefs] for a deep difference between interpretation and the 
description of phenomena in the other sciences" (p. 4). Given the Principle 
of Explicability, and (he way by which it situates interpretation within a 
global theory drawing on sources from other scientific areas, we see that it 
advocates 
the epislcmically sound strategy of seeking to fit what is 
observed within our best descriptive understanding of "how the 
world is," particularly with respect to the cognitive capacities 
and social processes of the creatures under study....The 
principles governing when and where to make adjustments 
arc...familiar, for they arc the same as those governing theory 
building, testing, and application in all scientific domains: 
simplicity of scheme, relative confirmation of relevant bits of 
theory, the relative promise of lines of research, and so forth (p. 
250). 
Consequently, the claim of methodological separatism collapses with the 
recognition that the Principle of Explicability aptly presents the bona fide 
codification of actual interpretive practices. 
In brief summary, Henderson's Principle of Explicability leads us to 
answer positively the question of whether interpretation gives us an 
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adequate means of comparing our views with those of another culture. We 
are not bound by methodological charity to merely read off what we have 
written into the translation manual, finding our subjects perfectly rational 
according to our norms. In striving to account for the views of others, we 
are bound to begin charitably, establishing a certain framework of 
correspondence between our views and those foreign to us. But this charity 
is in the service of bringing us to the point where the genuine interpretive 
work begins: where do our subjects surprise us with startlingly accurate or 
inaccurate views, and what reasons can we give for these anomalies? 
Working with a global theory, composed of dove-tailed research about the 
way we believe the world to be, we set out to find the areas where others 
don't meet our expectations. Ultimately the goal of such interpretive inquiry 
is to arrive at an understanding of the way things are, particularly in the 
areas of psychology and sociology, which will allow us to explain our 
differences from others, thereby understanding the relevant relations 
obtaining between their behaviors and beliefs. This explication, answering 
the hows and whys of others' behaviors, is the guiding principle for correct 
interpretive practice, and shares its basic methodology with the practices of 
the natural sciences. Let us turn now to Gadamer's approach, keeping the 
important issues from this theory in mind. 
II. Gadamer and the "Circle of Understanding" 
The basic insights of Gadamer's theory of interpretation are drawn from 
the concept of the "hermeneutic circle," mentioned above in the context of 
holism. For Gadamer, the holistic aspect of the process of understanding is 
aptly represented by the notion of the interpretive circle, but other aspects 
are represented therein as well: interpretation proceeds by way of 
approaching a text or action with certain expectations about the stale of 
affairs the text describes. This is to say, the first stage of interpretation is 
one in which our understanding of the world is read into the subject of our 
study by a sort of anticipatory prejudice. The failure of the text to equal our 
expectations opens the possibility of the undermining of our prejudices; by 
failing to say about reality what we had expected, the text brings our 
presuppositions into relief. At this stage, the possibility is opened for a 
matching of our network of beliefs with those expressed within the text, and 
differences show themselves as disagreements about the object of 
discussion. Valid interpretation strives to allow the opening of this 
possibility by situating itself between an objective view of the world and the 
view offered by the tradition from which the text emerges. Our discussion 
here will be directed to clarifying these issues as they arc articulated in "On 
the Circle of Understanding," with the aim of relating this approach to the 
account previously examined. 
The rule of the hermeneutic circle is familiarly described as the 
necessity of understanding the whole in terms of the parts, while 
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recognizing that the parts can only be given meaning under the projection of 
meaning for the whole. All interpretive procedures, all attempts at 
understanding, fall under the domain of this rule, as they strive to give 
meaning to contextually determined and connected actions and words, both 
spoken and written. "The anticipation of meaning, in which the whole is 
projected, is brought to explicit comprehension in that the parts, determined 
by the whole, determine this whole as well" (p. 6 8 ) . 7 That Gadamer's 
emphasis here is not simply that interpretive procedures must be holistic is 
apparent in his mention of meaning as "projected." His example is of the 
experience of learning a foreign language. In order to embark on an inquiry 
within the circle, one must make an initial projection of meaning to the 
whole; thus one gives a general idea of the meaning of the text to the whole 
in the translation of the first sentence. This overall meaning is clarified or 
rejected as more sentences are given a reading, and in the event of rejection, 
we return to the first sentence again, modifying our translation according to 
our new expectations. Thus, we see a back-and-forth movement between the 
reading of the whole and the part; this is the holistic aspect of the circular 
method. But we also notice the need for initial projections of meaning; 
there can be no opening to the circle without expectations found in the 
interpreter rather than the text. 
Surveying the history of the hcrmeneutic tradition, Gadamer critiques 
the previous notion that understanding another's speech or writings requires 
getting inside "the author's inner state; rather, if one wants to speak of 
'placing oneself, we place ourselves in his point of view....[W]e try to let 
stand the claim to correctness of what the other person says" (p. 69). This is 
to say, we recognize that the other person says something about something; 
a claim is being made about the world, and our job is to relate ourselves to 
this claim, not to the intentional state of its author. Clearly, the author's 
subjectivity can provide little illumination in the case of understanding 
ancient texts. But how do we go about "letting stand" the other's claim, and 
how do we relate ourselves to the other's point of view? 
For clarification, Gadamer turns to a passage from Heidegger's Being 
and Time: 
[Interpretation's] first, permanent, and final task remains that of 
not accepting from flashes of inspiration and popular notions a 
pretence of its own fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception, 
but rather to work these out of the subject matter itself and 
thereby to secure the topic under study.8 
7 Citations within Part II will be from Gadamer (1988), unless otherwise identified. 
8 Heidegger, M. (1927/1962). Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Verlag. Trans, as Being and 
Time by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. San Francisco: Harper & Row, p. 153/195. 
The translation offered here is that provided by Connolly and Keutner in their 
translation of Gadamcr, p. 70-1. For Heidegger's own explanation of and distinction 
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We can equate the notion of "fore-conception" with the expectations 
brought to the text by the interpreter in our example. Heidegger's directive 
is that we separate out the appropriate expectations, those worked "out of 
the subject matter i tself and true to the "topic under study," from the 
prejudices we have picked from the "popular notions" around us. In other 
words, certain views are true to the world and may be gained through 
appropriate study; correct interpretation requires that we approach the text 
with the expectations that it accord with these true-to-the-world views, 
rather than to ungrounded expectations gained from our biased cultural 
training or elsewhere. 
We shouldn't be misled into thinking that the suggestion here is to 
throw off our projections and just see the text "as it is." Interpretation can 
only begin with a projection of meaning onto a text, seeing it as a coherent 
unity which embodies some particular view of the world. It is this 
expectation of a definite meaning which allows the attribution of tentative 
meanings and continual revision as the text is unraveled. But "it makes 
good sense for the interpreter, animated by his ready pre-opinion, not to 
tackle the 'text' straight off, but rather to test the living pre-opinion in 
himself for its legitimacy, i.e. for its provenance and validity" (p. 72). In 
other words, the object under discussion in interpretation of a text is (at least 
initially) less the text itself than what the text is about. If one is to 
understand a text, one must first align her or his understanding of the world, 
since understanding the text requires "setting it in relation to the whole of 
one's own opinions" (p. 72). 
Awareness of our own pre-conceptions allows the shift from reading 
our expectations into the text to reading the text as an alternative view of 
reality. The valid interpreter is not interested in merely discovering her or 
his own views reflected back from the text because they have been read into 
it; rather, knowledge about her or his preconceptions allows the strangeness 
of the text to reveal itself, giving the text "a chance to play off its truth in 
the matter at hand against the interpreter's pre-opinion" (p. 73). According 
to Gadamer, who follows Heidegger's work on this point, the break between 
one's own attributions to the text through pre-opinionatcd expectation and 
the view implicit in the text itself is discovered through the interpreter's 
"historical consciousness" (p. 74). Put simply, the interpreter must be 
explicitly aware of the prejudices with which he or she approaches the text, 
recognizing their origin, implications, and historical siluatcdncss. To give 
an example of this method in practice, consider the contemporary reader of 
an English translation of Genesis. Comprehending the biblical references to 
the "firmament" requires knowledge about ancient cosmological beliefs; 
how these beliefs and their implications will be understood by us depends 
on our own knowledge of the universe, including the implications our 
between fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception, see Heidegger (1927/1962), p. 
HERMENEUTICS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EXPLICABILITY 69 
beliefs have for us and the different origins and methods from which ancient 
and contemporary theories about such matters are derived. Hence, 
knowledge of the historical situation of our own knowledge provides a 
grounding against which competing theories of other eras can be explicated. 
Returning to the first movement of our hermeneutic circling, the proper 
initial expectation, according to Gadamer, is "the anticipation of 
perfection:" 
It says that one can only understand that which represents a 
perfect unity of meaning. For example, we make this 
presupposition of perfection whenever we read a text. We only 
call this presupposition into question if it proves irredeemable, 
i.e., the text does not become comprehensible; perhaps we begin 
to have doubts about the authenticity of the text and set out to 
confirm it....The anticipation of perfection which guides all our 
understanding thus turns out to be one determined in each case 
by content...[T]he reader's comprehension is also constantly 
guided by transcendent expectations of meaning which arise 
from the relationship to the truth of what is meant (p. 74). 
We anticipate perfection in the text on two counts: unity and truth of 
reference. The first, as we have seen, is the presumption that the putative 
unity of the text's meaning will become apparent as our interpretation 
narrows in through its back-and-forth adjustment of meanings of parts and 
the whole. The second, that the text's statement about the world will turn 
out to be correct, is the upshot of the necessity of our reading into the text 
our entire view of the world (or, in a particular case, certain aspects of our 
global understanding). It is important to notice that what is naturally and 
immediately imputed to the text is the interpreter's own primary beliefs, 
rather than the beliefs which he or she may "know" to be correct. This is to 
say, rather than using technically correct information about the world, the 
interpreter will tend to read the subject text as incorporating the knowledge 
closest to him or her; perhaps if the text is making technical scientific 
claims, that realm of knowledge would come into play, but, generally 
speaking, the subject will be understood to articulate views only as technical 
as the interpreter's normal "folk" views. 
The breakdown of this charitable scheme comes when enough 
information has been gathered to realize the text fails, and we cannot 
continue to construe it as unified or correct by our normal standards. This is 
the point, at least with regard to the latter issue, where attempts to "explain" 
the text become important. "It is only the failure of the attempt to admit 
what is said as true that leads to the endeavor to 'understand' 
—psychologically or historically — the text as the opinion of another" (p. 
75). My interpretive emphasis shifts at this point from what is being said to 
the strangeness of its way of saying, requiring my invocation of 
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psychological or historical explanation to account for the error on the other's 
part. 
But the error may not rest with the other; it may rest with my own 
understanding of the world. It is also at the point where disagreements arise 
that my own prejudices are called into question. The opposing view 
presented by the text demands that I re-examine my expectations; are they 
demanding that the text conform to a view of the world which is incorrect, 
and can the text present a view which converts me? As Gadamer makes 
clear, interpretation is often thought to be hardest with respect to those 
writings or actions which come to us from the distant past. But, on this 
count at least, the trials of time and the history of interpretation of these 
writings and events comes to our aid: 
Filtering out the true meaning contained in a text or an artistic 
creation is, incidentally, itself an unending process. The 
temporal distance which accomplishes this filtering is engaged 
in a constant movement and enlargement, and this is the 
productive side which it possesses for understanding. It lets 
prejudices which catch only a part of the work die off, while 
letting those emerge which make possible a true understanding 
(p. 77). 
We may stand so close to our own prejudices, embodied within the culture 
to which we are socialized, that the false bias these opinions give us misses 
the meaning the text articulates. Through time, interpretations linked to the 
biases of a particular culture and era die out, allowing the true meaning of 
the text to gradually come to light. 
But the help of a history of interpretation for a text is not always 
available, and we must, therefore, cultivate the necessary historical 
consciousness to recognize our own biases. In effect, this process occurs 
along with interpretation, as our implicit opinions come to light against the 
contrast created by meanings within the text. With our biases made 
apparent in this manner, we can suspend judgement about the stale of things 
in question, allowing for the possibility of our own error and the possibility 
of learning from the text: 
The truth is that one's own prejudice only really gets involved in 
the game by becoming itself at stake in the game. Only by 
playing out its role can it become so teamed up with the other 
that it too I the other] can play out its role (p. 78). 
Therefore, the alien aspects of the text under consideration can only be 
appreciated as alien, as radically differentiated from my own beliefs, when 
my expectations are foiled, and the differences between my view of the 
world and that articulated by the text are given room to emerge. 
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The emphasis in Gadamer's account is ultimately on the interplay of 
opinions and prejudices between the interpreter and the subject of 
interpretation. Both bring to their meeting point a perspective on the nature 
of the world mediated by a tradition. The job of the interpreter is to stand 
somewhere between the tradition put forward in the text and the truth of the 
matter in question: close enough to the text to allow its view to emerge, but 
far enough away to hold this view against his or her own expectations, 
which are really the whole of his or her opinions about the world. Initially, 
we must enter the holistic interplay of interpretation by expecting the text's 
views to match our own, and expecting a unity of meaning to unfold 
between the parts and whole. If the unity of meaning we seek can't be 
reconciled with our reading, or the views don't match our expectations when 
it unfolds, we enter the task of explanation: we set the text's claims about 
the world against ours, and if ours hold, we relate the viewpoints of the 
text's tradition to our own to find reasons for the divergence. If, however, 
our own incorrect biases come to light, our examination of them provides us 
with an opportunity to learn about the world from the text. The explanatory 
task turns toward realizing the origins of our own false biases. With this 
characterization in place, we can now turn to the task of relating 
Henderson's and Gadamer's accounts. 
III. Explication as a Moment of the Hermeneut ic Circle 
From the explanation of these two accounts, several points should be 
clear. First, the basic emphasis on charity in the initial stages of 
interpretation is similar. Approaching the subject with a set of expectations 
gives the interpreter the opportunity to achieve a basic bridgehead of 
similarities with which to work. This charitable approach is weighted in 
either case, although we will need to examine the differences between the 
accounts of this weighting. After the initial stage has provided this similar 
background, the possibility of disagreement (or genuine agreement) 
emerges, and the actual interpretive work gels underway. Secondly, 
contrasts emerge. Henderson thinks of this latter stage in terms of the 
explanations wc will need to give for surprises; why haven't the natives 
matched our descriptive generalizations? Accounting for this requires 
continued study of the way the world operates, particularly with regard to 
psychology and sociology, in the hopes that our theories will turn up 
explanations for what seem to be anomalous behaviors. Gadamer, whose 
work is directed more toward the study of texts, focuses less on our need to 
explain surprises to our expectations than on the possibility of our learning 
from the text. This difference arises from a contrasting focus, but may lead 
us to important insights into each account. Here our goal will be to bring 
the implications of each theory into the open to see the questions each raises 
about the other. 
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Henderson suggests that certain charitable contributions be made to get 
the study underway. We need to take the natives' utterances and their 
assents and dissents at face-value; we need to assume that they are making 
meaningful statements, which can eventually be understood; and we need to 
approach them with expectations derived from our own sociological and 
psychological observations and generalizations. About the first two claims, 
Gadamer is in accord: we read the text with expectations of a coherent 
meaning, assuming that it has something to say about something. But on 
the latter point, concerning the informing of our expectations about the 
world, he takes a slightly different approach: 
Just as the addressee of a letter understands the news he receives 
and, to begin with, sees things with the eyes of the letter writer, 
i.e. takes what the writer says to be true — instead of, say, trying 
to understand the writer's opinion as such — so we too 
understand the texts which are handed down on the basis of 
expectations of meaning drawn from our own relationship to the 
issues under discussion (Gadamer, pp. 74-5). 
This point relates directly to how the principle of charily in early stages of 
interpretation should be weighted. The contrast is a subtle one: Henderson 
sees our weighted principle of charity as an application of descriptive 
generalizations of current psychological and sociological theory. In the 
case of a recently-trained anthropologist, we may indeed expect the 
charitable approach to be influenced by such recent and highly-theoretical 
scientific endeavors. But consider "normal" everyday communication: the 
typical student faced with ancient philosophy or an American tourist in a 
foreign land. The expectations in these cases will be determined by "our 
own relationship to the issues under discussion. "This difference in account 
could merely reflect the difference in focus between the two theories. The 
following two questions, however, are raised: (a) is Henderson's account a 
codification of actual interpretive practices or of a normative guide for such 
practices, and (b) granting that our psychological and sociological theories 
give us information about (he way people process information, are we not 
ourselves therefore subject to the failings of normative rationality explained 
therein? 9 These questions raise issues beyond the scope of this paper, but 
we may want to ask if our recently trained anthropologist is different in kind 
from the American tourist, or has she simply embodied a radically different 
relationship of her own to the "issues under discussion." 
9 To put this more clearly, our psychological theories tell us that people do not 
think according to normative rules. In our own application of descriptive 
generalizations within a charitable attribution, therefore, we will not proceed 
according to normative rules (being, at least in part, subject to the restrictions of our 
own descriptive generalizations). Thus, what will be attributed will always be, in 
some sense, our own view, not that proscribed by our theoretical understanding. 
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Gadamcr suggests that we approach a text with an "anticipation of 
perfection." At first this may sound like an unacceptable strong version of 
charity, until, that is, we couple this notion with the distinctions just made. 
We anticipate perfect agreement between the text or the natives and 
ourselves, not agreement between them and normative rationality. I think in 
terms of the sun rising and setting, although I realize that this is, 
scientifically, an inaccurate description. Still, upon meeting a native who 
informally spoke in terms of the earth orbiting the sun, I would be surprised. 
My surprise wouldn't necessarily be a response to the native's cosmological 
knowledge, but more likely a reaction to unusual everyday 
conceptualizations of the world. Of course, if my way of thinking is 
unusually close to logical norms, deviance from this way of thinking will 
surprise me. Ergo, I may be dumbfounded at the errors committed by 
students of elementary logic, even to the point of being unable to explain to 
them the basic rules of reasoning I take to be obvious . 1 0 
Gadamer and Henderson both see initial charitable contribution, albeit 
weighted differently, as contributing to the future possibility of genuine 
differentiation between the interpreter's and the subject's beliefs. Thus, 
charity ends at a certain stage: for Henderson, when enough information has 
been gleaned to allow opinions we find inexplicable to surface; and for 
Gadamer, when the information our reading has provided finally proves 
irreconcilable with our own pre-opinions. On Henderson's view, charity is 
in the service of making the other's behavior explicable. We want to 
understand the relations of the other's beliefs and actions. Gadamer sees 
interpretation as directed toward agreement, with initial pre-opinions 
allowing disagreements to become explicit. These are then either 
explicated, in much the same way as Henderson describes (with the 
difference that they are related to our own opinions rather than necessarily 
scientific explanation), or resolved into agreement by our taking on the 
views of the text. 
The emphasis on explicability rather than agreement follows from the 
sort of cases with which Henderson is concerned. Approaching other 
cultures from the standpoint of a technological society with advanced and 
articulated views about the world, most of our anthropological interpretation 
will be directed toward an understanding of why other cultures don't share 
our opinions. In most cases, we will have good reasons to believe our 
scientific views are better. Hence, most disagreements will be resolved by 
one side of the course Gadamer describes: understanding why we cannot 
agree with the text but must instead recognize the biases and prejudices 
within its tradition. 
M To be fair to Henderson, it seems unlikely that someone who reasoned according 
to logical norms wouldn't come to recognize that others usually don't. Thus, 
descriptive generalizations arc born. But it seems that this generalization will be 
aimed at explaining why others reason differently than myself, not vice versa — 
though I, as the perfect reasoncr, would be the anomaly! 
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But the Principle of Explicability does less justice to cases where we 
may actually become convinced that our subject is correct, and our own 
theories about the world are not. Again, this is due to the subjects on which 
Gadamer focuses. Most learning fits into this category. Consider, for 
instance, a student of philosophy reading Quine's Word & Object or 
Heidegger's Being and Time. Depending on the student's background, he or 
she may in fact spend some energy explicating the faults of the world-view 
within these texts; on the other hand, the second of Gadamer's directions 
will most likely come into play in most cases. The student's own pre-
o p t i o n s about the world will be brought into question, through the conflict 
of these prejudices with the view of the text. The text then makes its case, 
and the student may learn, i.e. come to understand the matter under 
discussion into a new way. For Gadamer, this latter confrontation of 
opinions is the more primary sort of end for an interpretive path to take. 
While questions of primacy are not easily answered, we may at least pose 
the following question: would the most appropriate codification of actual 
interpretive practice see "explicability" in terms of explaining the 
differences of the subject from the expectations of scientific descriptive 
generalizations, or in terms of understanding the subject's view on the 
matter at hand in relation to my own? 
Henderson's view that, in the later stages of interpretation, one strives 
to model the behaviors of the subject in terms of "relevance relations" seems 
parallel to Gadamer's desire to "see from the other's point of view," although 
Henderson has perhaps articulated this goal more thoroughly. Also, it is 
clear that Henderson's notion of "global theory" coming into play in the 
interpretive process translates closely into Gadamer's notion that the 
subject's claims about the world are understood "in relation to the whole of 
one's own opinions." Gadamer is silent on the issue of methodological 
separatism, and the direction in which his theory points isn't immediately 
obvious, but he does suggest that all understanding has a hermeneutic 
character. Presumably, this would include understanding in the natural 
sciences, although what the structure of the appropriate hermeneutic 
approach would be in such a case is not spelled out here . 1 1 
In conclusion, the two accounts, Henderson's drawing upon recent 
Anglo-American work and Gadamer's upon the Continental tradition, 
attribute a similar structure to interpretive practice. As we have seen, each 
recognizes the necessity of approaching the subject to be interpreted in an 
initially charitable manner, this charitable attribution making way for the 
recognition of differences between the interpreter's expectations and the 
11 It seems that Gadamer would be more inclined to group the natural sciences 
under interpretation than vice versa. The reasons for this have to do with his theory 
concerning Wirkungsgeschicln ("the history of influence"), not explicitly discussed 
here: "Understanding is a process in the history of influence, and it could be proven 
that it is in the linguisticality belonging to all understanding that the hermeneutical 
event makes its path" (p. 78). See also the editors' introduction, p. 33. 
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subject's revelations. In this regard, the two accounts are closer to each 
other than to predecessors in each's respective tradition in many cases. 
Possibly due to differences of focus, however, the theories diverge with 
respect to the weighting applied to the expectations of the interpreter, and in 
what is regarded as the ultimate goal of interpretation. The relationship 
between these approaches, and the questions raised by their differences, 
may indicate the direction new work in this area could take. Among the 
questions which need to be addressed are the interpreter's own relation to 
the theories about the world which are applied charitably in the early stages 
of interpretation, and whether the Principle of Explicability provides a 
satisfactorily encompassing view of interpretation in the case where 
differences are resolved in favor of the subject's view of the world rather 
than the interpreter's. 
